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Abstract
This paper compares the resilience of Socially Responsible Invest-
ment (SRI) funds with that of conventional funds towards the global
ﬁnancial crisis by using an event study methodology. Taking the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as the particular event, we estimated
the average cumulative abnormal returns of both SRI funds and con-
ventional funds. Our results show that SRI funds are more resilient
to such a shock. Similar results are obtained by an estimation with a
market model that accounts for ARCH eﬀects.
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11 Introduction
The global recession after the subprime crisis has dealt a crippling blow to
the economy not only in the United States but all over the world. Since 2007,
the potential global writedowns on loans and securities due to this ﬁnancial
crisis were estimated to be 4.1 trillion US dollars (IMF, 2009). The falls
in GDP from 2008 to 2009 were -2.6%, -4.1%, -5.2% and -4.9% in the US,
Euro Area, Japan and the UK, respectively (IMF, 2010). Major economic
indicators show the seriousness of the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis: without
doubt it has been the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression
in 1929.
One of the causes of the economic crisis was subprime lending, which was
intended for low-income households or subprime borrowers and which would
inevitably lead to defaults. The loans were securitized into wide-ranging ﬁ-
nancial commodities not to be able to track who should be responsible for
defaults. Investment behaviour focusing extensively on short-term economic
gains has compounded the problem. While there are calls for remedying the
situation by tightening regulation of, and governance over ﬁnancial institu-
tions, there already exists a self-regulation mechanism in the market that is
potentially eﬀective in enhancing corporate activity for social proﬁt: that is,
Socially Responsible Investments (hereafter SRI).
Socially Responsible Investment is an investment process using positive
or negative screening that takes into account not only ﬁnancial performance
but also the value of Corporate Social Responsibility (hereafter CSR), such
as voluntary activities for environmental or social issues, before making in-
vestment decisions. SRI has grown rapidly throughout the world over recent
2decades. At the end of 2007, Eurosif (2008) reported the EU had the biggest
SRI market in the world with 3,922 billion US dollars (calculated at the ex-
change rate on 31st of December, 2007) and the US followed the second with
2,711 billion US dollars (Social Investment Forum, 2010).
Even though the performance of SRI might go down because of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis, the degree of fall in the return of SRI would be lower compared
to conventional investments if CSR activity were evaluated positively by the
market and investors in SRI funds were more resistant to the shock. On
the other hand, should investors consider CSR as merely a cost that make a
company’s economic situation worse, SRI performed more poorly than con-
ventional investment.
Previous studies have compared SRI funds and conventional funds with
respect to their economic performance (Hamilton et al., 1993; Bauer et al.,
2005; Jones et al., 2008; Climent and Soriano, forthcoming) and invest-
ment behaviour (McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Bollen, 2007; Benson and
Humphrey, 2008). However, their resilience to a large-scale shock to the
economy has not been examined enough. Consequently, an investigation of
their resilience would help towards a truer evaluation of the performance of
the self-regulation mechanism that the ﬁnancial market has developed.
This study aims to examine the resilience of SRI funds compared to that
of conventional funds towards the global ﬁnancial crisis in one of the biggest
ﬁnancial markets, Japan using the event study methodology. Based on the
assumption of an eﬃcient market, an event study casts light on the impact
of an unanticipated event on changes in stock prices. For this purpose, the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was chosen as the event to be studied, since
3it triggered the ﬁnancial crisis.
The main ﬁnding of this study is that the abnormal negative impact of
the global ﬁnancial crisis on SRI funds was less than that on conventional
funds. The Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR) of SRI funds
was -0.0034 and that of conventional funds was -0.0112. They are both
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and the diﬀerence between the ACAR
of SRI funds and that of conventional funds is also statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
The rest of this paper is composed as follows. Previous studies that com-
pared SRI funds with conventional funds are reviewed in Section 2. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 introduces the event study methodology along
with a market model that accounts for ARCH eﬀects. Estimated results are
summarized in Section 5. The implication of results are discussed in Section
6. The Section 7 summarizes our ﬁndings.
2 Previous Studies
There exist a considerable number of academic studies that compare SRI and
conventional investments. These studies can be divided into two categories.
The ﬁrst category discusses whether or not SRI funds outperform or under-
perform funds that are not socially screened. The general ﬁnding from those
studies is that the diﬀerence between SRI funds and conventional funds is not
statistically signiﬁcant, although it depends on the time and area analysed
(Renneboog et al., 2008).
Hamilton et al. (1993) is one of the earliest studies to compare the perfor-
4mances of SRI funds and conventional funds. They used the monthly return
data of equity mutual funds in the United States from 1981 through 1990. In
order to measure the performance, they used Jensen’s alpha in their study.
Based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (hereafter CAPM), Jensen’s al-
pha measures the performance of the stock relative to the market portfolio
(Jensen, 1968). The mean monthly excess return of SRI funds established
in 1985 or earlier was greater than that of conventional funds, though the
diﬀerence between them was not statistically signiﬁcant. As for the funds
established after 1985, the mean excess return of SRI funds was lower than
that of conventional funds but not at a statistically signiﬁcant level. The
results indicated that the market did not value the non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts of
SRI funds.
Although the market size of SRI is still small relative to the market in US
or Europe, SRI has been developing in the emerging market, too. Cheung et
al. (2010) obtained that the average CSR scores among ﬁrms in the Asian
market such as China, Hong Kong, India and Indonesia has increased over
2001 to 2004, which indicates ﬁrms in those countries have exhibited greater
attention to CSR. Moreover, they found positive and statistically signiﬁcant
relationships between CSR score and ﬁrm’s market value in terms of Tobin’s
Q and market-to-book ratio.
For developed countries, similar results were obtained. Bauer et al. (2005)
investigated the performance of SRI funds and that of conventional funds in
Germany, the UK, and the US for the 1990 through 2001 period. Unlike
the earlier studies, they included dead funds in the sample. If dead funds
were disregarded in the estimation, the results would be overestimated: this
5is called survivorship bias (Brown et al., 1992). They therefore added dead
funds to the sample in order to mitigate the survivorship bias. They used the
CAPM model and found that, in all regions, there was no statistically signif-
icant diﬀerence in performance between SRI funds and conventional funds,
even though most SRI funds outperformed conventional funds in value. In
terms of diﬀerences in exposure to market risk, SRI funds were signiﬁcantly
less sensitive than conventional funds except in the case of the US inter-
national mutual funds. They used the multi-factor model introduced by
Carhart (1997) that was developed from the 3-factor model of Fama and
French (1993). Although SRI funds outperformed to conventional funds in
all areas (except Germany) in value, there was again no statistically signif-
icant diﬀerence in returns between SRI funds and conventional funds, even
after controlling for four factors. Moreover, they analysed how people in
three countries have been pricing CSR through time by subtracting Jensen’s
alpha of conventional funds from that of SRI funds in these four-year periods:
1990-1993, 1994-1997, and 1998-2001. Except in the UK domestic market,
SRI funds signiﬁcantly underperformed conventional funds in the earliest pe-
riod, but in the third period SRI funds in all areas outperformed conventional
funds. Given these outcomes, it seems that SRI funds have been catching up
on conventional funds, probably as a result of greater investor conﬁdence in
them.
Bollen (2007) raised the interesting question, whether investor behaviours
in SRI funds and conventional funds are diﬀerent: this brings us to the
second category of studies on SRI. He examined the relation between fund
ﬂows and return for SRI funds in the US. It was found that SRI funds were
6more sensitive to lagged positive returns than conventional funds, whilst SRI
investors exhibited a smaller response to negative returns than investors in
conventional funds for the period 1980 through 2002. Further, he showed
that ﬂow volatility was lower in SRI funds than in conventional funds for
the period 1991 to 2002. In other words, the frequency of SRI investors
moving money into or out of funds was lower compared to conventional fund
investors. From this it can be concluded that SRI investors were more loyal
than investors in conventional funds.
While Bollen (2007) focused on the single relationship between past re-
turns and money ﬂows for US SRI funds, Renneboog et al. (2006) expanded
the analysis by investigating whether or not the investment decision was
made not only with past returns in mind but also with other factors such
as fund size, age, risk, and the fee structure. Their main ﬁndings were that
investors in SRI funds chased past returns, return rankings, and persistence
in performance the same as conventional investors did. Just as Bollen (2007)
had found, investors in SRI funds did not mind negative returns that much
more than positive returns, unless poor performance persisted. In addition,
higher money inﬂows were induced by smaller, younger funds or funds be-
longing to the large-fund families. They also showed that higher intensity
of screenings attracted more inﬂows than otherwise: however, some types
of screenings such as environmental screens or ethical screens, lowered cash
ﬂows. On the other hand, the volatility of money ﬂows in SRI funds was
greater than that in conventional funds unless poor performance persisted.
Furthermore, they indicated smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds were asso-
ciated with a higher magnitude of volatility of money ﬂows than conventional
7funds were.
Benson and Humphrey (2008) provided further insight into SRI investor
behaviour by incorporating both monthly and annual returns in order to
investigate if investors react to current and/or past information, and also
by incorporating lagged ﬂow to take into account the persistence of fund
ﬂow. The ﬂow of SRI funds was a negative function of current, past, and
lagged returns, unlike the conventional fund ﬂow. This suggested that SRI
investors cared about returns less than their conventional counterparts; this
would accord with the hypothesis that investors in SRI funds obtain some
additional non-ﬁnancial utility. The lagged ﬂow was signiﬁcantly positive
and its coeﬃcient was larger than that of the conventional one. This means
that SRI fund ﬂows were more persistent than conventional funds. There-
fore, it seems likely that investors in SRI funds reinvest in funds they have
already owned. Benson and Humphrey also investigated the diﬀerences in
the ﬂow-performance relation for the best and worst performing funds. While
conventional fund investors responded to a good performance greatly but re-
acted less to a poor performance, SRI fund investors were less sensitive to
performance than conventional fund investors were.
In summary, the earlier studies found that investors do not consider SRI
as ”costs” – at least since there is no diﬀerence in performance between SRI
funds and conventional funds. In terms of investor behaviour, SRI investors
are more loyal than conventional investors, since SRI funds are more sensitive
to lagged positive returns but less so to negative returns. Taking these results
into consideration, we would expect that, even though most countries in
the world experienced a recent signiﬁcant economic downturn, SRI investors
8might hold their funds instead of selling them oﬀ. Further, it is known that
political support for environment-friendly industries has spread, mainly in
developed countries. Thus we set up a hypothesis that SRI funds can be more
resilient towards a negative impact than conventional funds, and we examine
this hypothesis using the event study methodology. Although Curran and
Moran (2007) used an event study to investigate the impact on corporate
ﬁnancial performance of inclusion in or deletion from the SRI index, their
focus was not on evaluating SRI funds compared with other funds. This
study, therefore, is the ﬁrst attempt to use the event study methodology to
analyse the impact of a speciﬁc event on SRI funds and conventional funds
and compare the results.
3 Data
The ﬁrst SRI fund in Japan was launched in 1999 and its history is much
shorter than similar funds in Europe and the US (Social Investment Forum
Japan, 2010a). While investors in SRI funds in Europe and the US are
basically institutional investors, especially in pension funds, in Japan most
investment is in the publicly oﬀered SRI funds targeting individual investors.
Figure 1 shows changes in the number of publicly oﬀered SRI funds in Japan
and their total net assets in billion US dollars (Social Investment Forum
Japan, 2010b). In the beginning of the SRI market in Japan, there were
only a few funds. Both the number of funds and their total net assets have
steadily been growing, though there was a sudden considerable decrease in
2008 due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Total net assets of the SRI funds amount
9to 5.4 billion US dollars in 2010; this represents only 0.7% of the Japanese
mutual fund market, a smaller share than in Europe and the US, where SRI
funds represent 10% of those mutual fund markets. The main screening has
been directed at the environmental aspect since 2007; it is reported that, as
of 2009, 80% of SRI funds are environmentally screened. Although domestic
equity funds made up the mainstream of investment types for many years,
international equity funds have expanded and now account for 60% of SRI
funds in Japan as environment-related funds keep increasing. Sakuma and
Louche (2008) summarise the characteristics of Japanese SRI as ”Japan has
adopted a ’soft’ version of European SRI, choosing for engagement rather
than activism, and for positive screening rather than exclusion.”
Figure 2 shows the number of conventional funds and their total net
assets in Japan (The Investment Trusts Association, Japan, 2010). While the
SRI fund market in Japan is still developing, the conventional fund market
seems to have already matured, hence there has been no rapid increase in
the number and net assets of conventional funds. The conventional funds
experienced a slight drop in total net assets, (compared to that of SRI funds),
and their number has been gradually increasing since 2004.
To conduct our analysis, we used data on the value of funds and on the
market portfolio. The daily return data of publicly oﬀered investment trusts
is available from the Investment Trusts Association Japan, which gives a
sample of 3,824 funds at the end of July 2010. Data on privately oﬀered
investment trusts are unavailable and therefore these were not included in
our sample. We used the Social Investment Forum (SIF) Japan classiﬁca-
tion to identify SRI funds, of which there are 89 listed for the same time.
10Table 1: Sample Numbers
Domestic International Total
SRI 24 38 62
Conventional 793 1343 2136
Total 817 1381 2198
An additional condition was that the funds had to be surviving during the
whole of the research period, which was from 7th of February through 17th
of September in 2008. As a result, our data covers 2,136 conventional funds
62 SRI funds (for these latter, see Appendix A). Funds can be also classi-
ﬁed into domestic or international funds. Domestic funds are mutual funds
that invest stocks and/or bonds of mainly domestic companies, whilst in-
ternational funds largely invest those of companies outside the country. In
accordance with the criteria, there are 793 domestic conventional funds and
24 domestic SRI funds. International funds have 1343 conventional funds
and 38 SRI funds (See Table 1). In addition, we used the Tokyo Stock Price
Index (TOPIX) obtained from Datastream as the market index.
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the fund returns of SRI and
conventional funds. The fund return is calculated as Equation 1 in Section
4. Therefore, each fund has 152 returns in this period. The basic statistics
shows that the average return and standard deviation of both types of funds
were similar in the whole period.
11Figure 1: The Number of SRI Funds and Total Net Assets in Japan
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Observation Mean S.D. Min. Max.
SRI 9,424 -0.0009067 0.0150 -0.0672 0.0661
Conventional 325,128 -0.0008833 0.0135 -0.1852 0.1131
Market proxy 152 -0.0009978 0.0168 -0.0519 0.0410
12Figure 2: The Number of Conventional Funds and Total Net Assets in Japan
134 Methodology
4.1 Event Study Methodology with OLS
Event study methodology was introduced by Fama et al. (1969) for the pur-
pose of examining the relationship between a particular unanticipated event
and changes in the stock prices. Numerous studies have analysed whether
or not either a positive or a negative CSR-related event has an impact on a
corporation’s share price (Arora, 2001; Gupta and Goldar, 2005; Hamilton,
1995; Takeda and Tomozawa, 2006; Yamaguchi, 2008; Yamaguchi, 2009).
The validity of an event study relies on a few assumptions: the notion of
market eﬃciency; the unexpectedness of the event; and the nonexistence of
other events that could aﬀect the share price during the event chosen for anal-
ysis (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). In order to conduct our event study, we
needed to deﬁne the event window, that is, the period examined for changes
in fund prices. We set three days as our event window: the day before the
event, the day of the event, and the day after the event. The event window is
normally set for a period longer than the day of the event in order to include
any changes in the fund price resulting from information leaked before the
event happened, and to include the investment action taken by latecomers
on the day following the event.
Since the Japanese market was closed on 15th September 2008 due to
public holiday, we identify the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 16th of
September 2008 as the event day (designated here as T0), designated the last
transaction day before the event (12th of September) as T−1, and designated
the transaction day following the event (17th of September) as T+1. Ad-
14ditionally, we used the fund price data for 150 transaction days before the
event window as our estimation window. Using the following formula, we
calculate the fund returns from fund prices:
ri,t = log(Pi,t/Pi,t−1), (1)
where ri,t is the fund return and Pi,t is the fund price on day t for ﬁrm i.
Next, we need to estimate the normal return, which is the counterfactual
return if the event does not occur. There is an assumption that the return of
the market proxy (TOPIX in this study) and the return of each fund have a
linear relationship. In order to calculate the normal return, αi and βi should
be estimated in the market model with data from the estimation window, as
shown below:
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + ϵi,t, (2)
where E[ϵi,t] = 0 and V ar[ϵi,t] = σ2
(ϵi,t); rm,t is the return of the market
index; αi and βi are unknown parameters. With estimated parameters, the
normal return for each day of the three-day event window can be estimated;
subtracting this from the realized return gives the abnormal return (AR).
ARi,t = ri,t − (ˆ αi + ˆ βirm,t). (3)
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated after adding the
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Once ACAR is obtained, we need to test the null hypothesis that the










If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, it becomes meaningless to interpret
the value of ACAR.
4.2 Event Study Methodology with EGARCH
Most earlier studies listed in Section 4.1 used an event study methodology
that does not account for heteroskedasticity. The standard market model
assumes that the residuals of share price are simply white noise. However,
16ﬁnancial time series data such as share prices or the exchange rates generally
have nonconstant variance. An Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic-
ity (ARCH) model (Engle,1982) and a more extended version of the ARCH
model, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH)
processes (Bollerslev, 1986) were introduced to account for heteroskedastic-
ity. In several earlier studies, the GARCH model was employed to estimate
time-varying conditional variance, but it has some limitations (for exam-
ple, it imposes the nonnegative restriction on the estimators). On the other
hand, the Exponential General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic-
ity (EGARCH) model introduced by Nelson (1991) does not assume the
nonnegative constraint when using a natural logarithm, so it is superior to
the GARCH model since the nonnegative conditions are often violated by
estimators. We use the EGARCH (1,1) model to conﬁrm that the result
from OLS methodology is robust. In the same manner as in the OLS model,
parameters must be estimated to calculate the normal return. The error
term is divided into the independent white noise and the standard error:
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + ϵi,t, (8)
where ϵi,t =
q
hi,tυi,t. The variance of the standard error, called the condi-
tional variance, can be shown as















where ϵi,t|Ωt ∼ N(0,hi,t)and Ω is the information set at time t on which the
distribution of errors is assumed to be conditioned. This is well known as
17the conditional variance equation in the EGARCH (1,1) model. The abnor-
mal returns, the cumulative abnormal returns, and the averaged cumulative
abnormal returns are estimated in the same manner as in OLS.
In order to obtain the standardized residual terms, we need to calculate
the conditional variance in each three-day event window for ﬁrm i using
estimated parameters in Equation (9) and using data from the estimation
window. Once the conditional variances for each event window are calculated
for ﬁrm i, we can take the exponential for each of them and ﬁnd the average
over the three-days, and then we can obtain the averaged conditional variance
for ﬁrm i as follows:
¯ hi(T−1,T1) =
exp(ˆ hi,T−1) + exp(ˆ hi,T0) + exp(ˆ hi,T1)
3
. (10)
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5.1 Results with OLS
We estimate the ACARs for the group of SRI funds and the group of con-
ventional funds. In this study, each ACAR shows the degree of impact of
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on the return. The ACAR of SRI funds is
-0.0034 and that of conventional funds is -0.0112, as shown in Table 3. They
are both statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Therefore, we can reject the
null hypothesis that the event did not have any eﬀect on the funds. As can be
seen from the results, the Lehman Brothers collapse did have a negative im-
pact on both types of fund. Still, SRI funds obviously have more resilience
towards the event. The diﬀerence in the ACARs between SRI funds and
conventional funds is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In order to analyse how serious this negative shock was, we would have
to compare the obtained ACARs with other event studies. Unfortunately,
there have been no other event studies using fund data that we know of.
Comparison of the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on SRI funds with other
events that might aﬀect the returns of SRI funds would require further study.
5.2 Results with EGARCH
If data contains an ARCH eﬀect, it means the data has heteroskedasticity. We
conducted an ARCH-LM test for all of the data and found that 34 out of 62
SRI funds and 1,003 out of 2,139 conventional funds have ARCH eﬀects. (The
results of the ARCH-LM test for SRI funds are shown in Appendix B). Since
it is conﬁrmed that there exists an ARCH-eﬀect in a considerable number of
19Table 3: Comparisons of ACAR
















***=Signiﬁcant at 1%. **=Signiﬁcant at 5%.
Numbers in parentheses and square brackets are
J statistics and t statistics respectively.
funds, we also analysed the data using the EGARCH (1,1) model. As with the
OLS model, we estimated the ACARs for both SRI funds and conventional
funds. We found that the ACAR of SRI funds is -0.0024, which is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the ACAR of conventional
funds is -0.0110, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Here again,
we can reject the null hypothesis that the Lehman Brothers collapse did
not have any eﬀect on fund performance. Both SRI and conventional funds
suﬀered from that company’s bankruptcy, though the degree of impact on
SRI funds is much lower than that on conventional funds, and its diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
6 Discussion
Why was the impact of ﬁnancial crisis on SRI funds smaller than that on
conventional funds? One possible reason is that SRI investors might have
supposed that a company aiming at CSR would be one that has a long-term
20strategy. They would then believe that such a ﬁrm could be more likely
to come through the ﬁnancial crisis. It is consistent with the idea that the
activity of CSR is a factor that could bring a stable and growing development
for ﬁrms (Scalet and Kelly, 2010). Hence, they would have been less inclined
to sell oﬀ their funds on the day of the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers.
This section discusses the estimated result in terms of two other aspects that
can inﬂuence the size of impact: any possible diﬀerences of estimated result
between domestic and international funds, and maturity of funds.
6.1 Domestic and International Funds
Funds can be classiﬁed into domestic or international funds. Domestic funds
are mutual funds that invest stocks and/or bonds of mainly domestic com-
panies, whilst international funds largely invest those of companies outside
the country. If investors behave diﬀerently towards domestic SRI funds and
international SRI funds, this might result in diﬀerent response to the shock
by these funds.
As shown in Table 4, we sorted the whole sample out domestic funds
and international funds. We estimated the ACARs for the group of domestic
funds and the group of international funds since they could perform diﬀer-
ently. For domestic funds, the ACAR of SRI funds is estimated lower than
that of conventional funds by both of OLS and EGARCH methods although
the diﬀerence between two funds are not statistically signiﬁcant by OLS.
However, the ACAR of international SRI funds are less negatively aﬀected
by the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy than that of international conventional
funds and their diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant, which is similar result
21Table 4: Comparisons of ACAR: Domestic Funds and International Funds
Domestic International




























***=Signiﬁcant at 1%. **=Signiﬁcant at 5%. *=Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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J statistics and t statistics respectively.
to the one estimated with the whole sample. This result might indicate that
SRI investors value CSR related strategies of foreign companies than that of
domestic companies although it is diﬃcult to make a deﬁnitive interpreta-
tion about this result as the ratio of international stocks in the fund varies
considerably.
6.2 Fund Age
Another possibility is that investors might have been inﬂuenced by fund
attributes, in particular fund age. Renneboog et al. (2006) found that more
mature funds attracted less money ﬂow and also induced less volatility. The
expectations about a younger fund by a Bayesian investor would be more
diversiﬁed, so the younger fund would attract a higher money ﬂow (Bollen,
2007). The obvious conclusion one can come to is that fund age should be
taken into account when comparing SRI funds and conventional funds. As
can been seen in Table 5, the mean age of the SRI funds in our study is
22Table 5: Fund Age Comparison (days)
Mean S.D. Min Max Range
SRI 1819.435 893.6856 953 3998 3045
Conventional 2914.868 3616.139 906 151193 150287
much younger than that of the conventional funds, since the conventional
fund market has a much longer history.
Consequently, it is easy to suspect that the diﬀerence in the ACARs
result not because SRI funds are more resilient than conventional funds but
because SRI funds are younger on average than conventional funds. And
yet, there is no clear correlation between abnormal return and the maturity
of fund as correlation coeﬃcient between those of SRI fund is -0.0166 and
of conventional fund is 0.2094 (Figure 3 and 4). Therefore, the reason that
SRI funds were more resilient towards the ﬁnancial crisis might be because
investors evaluated the companies included in SRI funds positively, and so
they expected the funds would survive the critical situation.
23Figure 3: AR and Age of SRI Funds
24Figure 4: AR and Age of Conventional Funds
257 Conclusion
This study examined the resilience of SRI funds relative to conventional
funds towards the global ﬁnancial crisis in the Japanese market, making
use of event study methodology. We chose the bankruptcy of the Lehman
Brothers because it is known as the trigger of this greatest ﬁnancial crisis
since the Great Depression in 1929. The empirical results showed the event
signiﬁcantly had a negative impact on both groups of funds at the 1% level.
The ACAR for SRI funds was much smaller in absolute value than that of
the conventional funds and its diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. We conﬁrmed that the results are robust by using the EGARCH
processes to account for the heteroskedasticity. These results show that the
SRI funds are more resilient than conventional funds towards the bankruptcy
of the Lehman Brothers.
SRI investors might consider a corporation aiming at CSR as one with a
long-term management strategy. They therefore expect such ﬁrms more likely
to survive a ﬁnancial crisis than others less interested in CSR. We classiﬁed
both SRI and conventional funds into domestic and international funds and
estimated the ACARs of them. In the subgroup of domestic funds, the ACAR
of SRI funds was more aﬀected by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. On
the other hand, the ACAR of international SRI funds was smaller in absolute
value than that of conventional funds, which was similar result to the whole
sample. In addition, we also analysed the correlation between fund age and
abnormal return, since previous studies argues that the maturity of a fund
aﬀects fund ﬂow and volatility. However, abnormal return and fund age were
not correlated in the case of either type of fund.
26In future studies, other events could be examined in order to ascertain
how serious the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was. Comparison of the im-
pact of the ﬁnancial crisis on SRI funds with other events, using data from
other countries as well would provide useful information. Fund data in the
United States market could be analysed with the same methodology, since
the ﬁnancial crisis was triggered by defaults on subprime loans in the US.
Such studies might lead to some interesting comparison of the level of impact
on SRI funds in Japan with SRI funds elsewhere in the world.
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Appendix A: The list of SRI funds used for our analysis 
Fund 
ID 
Name of fund  Stock companies  Date 
established 
1  Nikko Eco Fund  Nikko Asset Management  20 Aug 1999 
2  Nenkin Tsumitate Eco Fund  Nikko Asset Management  31
st Oct 2001 
3  Sompo Japan Green Open  Sompo Japan  30 Sep 1999 
4  Eco Partners  Mitsubishi  UFJ  Trust  and 
Banking 
28 Jan 2000 
5  Asahi Life SRI Shakai Kouken Fund  Asahi  Asset  Life  Management 
Co., Ltd. 
28 Sep 2000 
6  Sumishin SRI Japan Open  The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
26 Dec 2003 
7  Sumishin DC Good Company  The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
27 Feb 2004 
8  Fukoku SRI Fund  Shinkin  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
27 Feb 2004 
9  Daiwa SRI Fund  Daiwa Asset Management  20 May 2004 
10  DC Daiwa SRI Fund  Daiwa Asset Management  20 July 2004 
11  Mitsubishi UFJ SRI Fund  Mitsubishi  UFJ  Trust  and 
Banking 
3 Dec 2004 
12  SAIKYO Nihon Kabushiki CSR Fund  PineBridge  Investments  Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
18 Mar 2005 
13  Risona Japan CSR Fund  PineBridge I n v e s t m e n t s  J a p a n  
Co., Ltd. 
18 Mar 2005 
14  Sompo Japan SRI Open  Sompo Japan  25 Mar 2005 
15  PineBridge  Hirogin  Nihon  Kabushiki 
CSR Fund 
PineBridge  Investments  Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
28 Apr 2005 
16  Nihon SRI Open  Okasan  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
12 Aug 2005 
17  Daiwa Eco Fund  Daiwa Asset Management  9 Mar 2006 
18  Sumishin Nihon Kabushiki SRI Fund  The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
12 Jun 2006  
  33 
19  Amundi Risona Woman J Fund  Amundi  Asset  Management 
Japan 
30 May 2006 
20  Chuo Mitsui Shakaiteki Sekinin Fund  Chuo  Mitsui  Asset  Management 
Co., Ltd. 
30 Nov 2006 
21  Shinkin SRI Fund  Shinkin  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
8 Dec 2006 
22  STAM  SRI  Japan  Open  (only  for 
SMA) 
The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
16 Feb 2007 
23  PineBridge Nihon Kabushiki SRI Fund  PineBridge  Investments  Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
20 Dec 2007 
24  Eco Balance  Sumitomo  Mitsui  Asset 
Management Co., Ltd. 
31 Oct 2000 
25  Nikko  Global  Sustainability  Fund  A 
(without hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management  17 Nov 2000 
26  Nikko  Global  Sustainability  Fund  B 
(with hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management  17 Nov 2000 
27  Nenkin  Tsumitate  Global 
Sustainability (without hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management  25 Oct 2001 
28  Nenkin  Tsumitate  Global 
Sustainability (with hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management  25 Oct 2001 
29  World  Water  Fund  A  Course  (with 
currency hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management  26 Mar 2004 
30  World Water Fund B Course (without 
currency hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management  26 Mar 2004 
31  Nomura Global SRI 100  Nomura Asset Management  28 May 2004 
32  Nomura  Sekai  SRI  Index  Fund  (for 
defined contribution pension fund) 
Nomura Asset Management  30 July 2004 
33  Chikyu Ondanka Boushi Kanren Kabu 
Fund 
Shinko  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
30 May 2006 
34  Nikko DWS New Resource Fund  Deutsche Asset Management  20 Dec 2006 
35  Global Water Fund  Nikko Asset Management  15 June 2007 
36  New Generation Sekai Kankyo  United Investments Co., Ltd.  29 June 2007  
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37  Chikyu Ondanka Boushi Kanren Kabu 
Fund (3-month closing type) 
Shinko  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
25 July 2005 
38  Mitsubishi UFJ Global Eco Water  Mitsubishi  UFJ  Trust  and 
Banking 
27 July 2007 
39  Nomura Aqua Toushi A Course (with 
exchange hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management  29 Aug 2007 
40  Nomura  Aqua  Toushi  B  Course 
(without exchange hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management  29 Aug 2007 
41  UBS  Chikyu  Ondanka  Taiou  Kanren 
Kabu Fund 
UBS Global Asset Management  31 Aug 2007 
42  Ondanka Taisaku Kabushiki Open  Kokusai Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
31 Aug 2007 
43  Chikyu  Ondanka  Taisaku  Kabushiki 
Open 
Kokusai Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
31 Aug 2007 
44  Chikyu Kankyo Kabu Fund  Daiwa Asset Management  31 Aug 2007 
45  DWS Shinshigen Technology Fund  Deutsche Asset Management  31 Aug 2007 
46  Ondanka Boushi Kankyo Kanren Kabu 
Open 
Okasan  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
27 Sep 2007 
47  Fidelity Three Basic Fund  Fidelity Investments Limited  29 Oct 2007 
48  Tokyo  Kaijo  Select  Sekai  Kabushiki 
Fund 
Tokio Marine Asset Management 
Co., Ltd. 
6 Dec 2007 
49  Amundi Sekai Mizukanren Kabushiki 
Fund 
Amundi  Asset  Management 
Japan 
17 Dec 2007 
50  TA Clean Energy Fund  Toyota  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
20 Dec 2007 
51  Amundi  Sekai  Kankyoryoku 
Kabushiki Fund 
Amundi  Asset  Management 
Japan 
21 Dec 2007 
52  DIAM  Koukakuzuke  Income  Open 
SRI (monthly closing type) 
DIAM Co., Ltd.  22 Dec 2005 
53  6  Shisan  Balance  Fund 
(distribution-type) 
Daiwa Asset Management  14 Mar 2006 
54  6 Shisan Balance Fund (growth-type)  Daiwa Asset Management  14 Mar 2006  
  35 
55  Shizen Kankyo Hogo Fund  DIAM Co., Ltd.  26 May 2006 
56  Sekai  6Shisan  Kintou  Bunsan  Fund 
(monthly distribution-type) 
Daiwa Asset Management  28 June 2006 
57  ”Shigagin” SRI 3Shisan Balance Open 
(distribution-type in the odd months) 
Daiwa Asset Management  27 Sep 2006 
58  Amundi  Womenomics  Balance 
Kabushiki  30  (monthly 
distribution-type) 
Amundi  Asset  Management 
Japan 
19 Jan 2007 
59  Amundi  Womenomics  Balance 
Kabushiki 30 (active growth) 
Amundi  Asset  Management 
Japan 
19 Jan 2007 
60  Chikyu Kankyo Kabu Gaisai Balance 
Fund 
Daiwa Asset Management  31 Aug 2007 
61  Kankyo Hozen Global Balance  Shinko  Asset  Management  Co., 
Ltd. 
14 Dec 2007 
62  Amundi R i s o n a  S e k a i  G r e e n  B a l a n c e  
Fund 
Amundi  Asset  Management 
Japan 
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Appendix B: ARCH-LM Test for SRI Funds 
ID   A RCH  Significance  ID  ARCH  Significance 
1  0.966067    32  15.87687  *** 
2  1.027735    33  16.22302  *** 
3  2.68646  *  34  7.315012  *** 
4  1.402577    35  3.2449  * 
5  0.010112    36  1.531446   
6  0.525505    37  16.2176  *** 
7  0.471471    38  5.985241  ** 
8  1.227087    39  3.641264  * 
9  0.116404    40  5.598984  ** 
10  0.087552    41  6.926547  *** 
11  0.00211    42  16.0997  *** 
12  1.582857    43  16.04057  *** 
13  0.948066    44  19.68416  *** 
14  0.163512    45  7.191673  *** 
15  1.650385    46  0.436857   
16  0.901857    47  6.381472  ** 
17  0.044793    48  29.76349  *** 
18  0.061683    49  33.6517  *** 
19  0.03634    50  0.752861   
20  0.040993    51  24.56617  *** 
21  1.197089    52  17.05208  *** 
22  0.695522    53  3.056855  * 
23  0.661225    54  0.630496   
24  0.082158    55  23.84215  *** 
25  25.51617  ***  56  0.096191   
26  25.48944  ***  57  9.647576  *** 
27  11.17471  ***  58  20.62302  *** 
28  12.13686  ***  59  5.670033  ** 
29  5.405308  **  60  20.79893  *** 
30  9.281398  ***  61  16.46026  *** 
31  15.70286  ***  62  24.95287  *** 
***=Significant  at  1%,  **=Significant  at  the  5%,  *=Significant  at  10%. 